Bump Seed Canonicalization

Summary

The create_program_address function derives a PDA but does so without searching for the canonical bump. It allows multiple valid bumps to produce different addresses. While this can still generate a valid PDA, it lacks determinism, as multiple bumps may yield different addresses for the same set of seeds.
Using find_program_address ensures that the highest valid bump, often referred to as the canonical bump, is used in the PDA derivation. This provides a deterministic way to compute an address for a given set of seeds, ensuring consistency across the program.
In Anchor, you can specify the seeds and the bump to ensure that PDA derivations in your account validation struct always align with the correct canonical bump.
Anchor also allows you to specify a bump directly in the validation struct using the bump = <some_bump> constraint. This ensures that the correct bump is used when verifying the PDA.
Using find_program_address can be computationally expensive due to the process of searching for the highest valid bump. It's considered best practice to store the derived bump in an account's data field upon initialization. This allows the bump to be referenced in subsequent instruction handlers, avoiding the need to repeatedly call find_program_address to re-derive the PDA.
#[derive(Accounts)] pub struct VerifyAddress<'info> { #[account( seeds = [DATA_PDA_SEED.as_bytes()], bump = data.bump )] data: Account<'info, Data>, }
In summary, while create_program_address can generate a PDA, find_program_address ensures consistency and reliability by always producing the canonical bump, which is critical for deterministic program execution. This helps maintain integrity in onchain apps, especially when validating PDAs across multiple instruction handlers.

Bump seeds are a number between 0 and 255, inclusive, used to ensure that an address derived using create_program_address is a valid PDA. The canonical bump is the highest bump value that produces a valid PDA. The standard in Solana is to always use the canonical bump when deriving PDAs, both for security and convenience.

Insecure PDA Derivation using create_program_address

Given a set of seeds, the create_program_address function will produce a valid PDA about 50% of the time. The bump seed is an additional byte added as a seed to "bump" the derived address into a valid territory. Since there are 256 possible bump seeds and the function produces valid PDAs approximately 50% of the time, there are many valid bumps for a given set of input seeds.

You can imagine that this could cause confusion in locating accounts when using seeds as a way of mapping between known pieces of information to accounts. Using the canonical bump as the standard ensures that you can always find the right account. More importantly, it avoids security exploits caused by the open-ended nature of allowing multiple bumps.

In the example below, the set_value instruction handler uses a bump that was passed in as instruction data to derive a PDA. The instruction handler then derives the PDA using create_program_address function and checks that the address matches the public key of the data account.

use anchor_lang::prelude::*;
 
declare_id!("ABQaKhtpYQUUgZ9m2sAY7ZHxWv6KyNdhUJW8Dh8NQbkf");
 
#[program]
pub mod bump_seed_canonicalization_insecure {
    use super::*;
 
    // Insecure PDA Derivation using create_program_address
    pub fn set_value(ctx: Context<BumpSeed>, key: u64, new_value: u64, bump: u8) -> Result<()> {
        let address =
            Pubkey::create_program_address(&[key.to_le_bytes().as_ref(), &[bump]], ctx.program_id)
                .unwrap();
        if address != ctx.accounts.data.key() {
            return Err(ProgramError::InvalidArgument.into());
        }
 
        ctx.accounts.data.value = new_value;
 
        Ok(())
    }
}
 
#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct BumpSeed<'info> {
    #[account(mut)]
    pub data: Account<'info, Data>,
}
 
#[account]
pub struct Data {
    pub value: u64,
}

While the instruction handler derives the PDA and checks the passed-in account, which is good, it allows the caller to pass in an arbitrary bump. Depending on the context of your program, this could result in undesired behavior or potential exploit.

If the seed mapping was meant to enforce a one-to-one relationship between PDA and user, for example, this program would not properly enforce that. A user could call the program multiple times with many valid bumps, each producing a different PDA.

Recommended Derivation using find_program_address

A simple way around this problem is to have the program expect only the canonical bump and use find_program_address to derive the PDA.

The find_program_address always uses the canonical bump. This function iterates by calling create_program_address, starting with a bump of 255 and decrementing the bump by one with each iteration. As soon as a valid address is found, the function returns both the derived PDA and the canonical bump used to derive it.

This ensures a one-to-one mapping between your input seeds and the address they produce.

pub fn set_value_secure(
    ctx: Context<BumpSeed>,
    key: u64,
    new_value: u64,
    bump: u8,
) -> Result<()> {
    let (address, expected_bump) =
        Pubkey::find_program_address(&[key.to_le_bytes().as_ref()], ctx.program_id);
 
    if address != ctx.accounts.data.key() {
        return Err(ProgramError::InvalidArgument.into());
    }
    if expected_bump != bump {
        return Err(ProgramError::InvalidArgument.into());
    }
 
    ctx.accounts.data.value = new_value;
    Ok(())
}

Use Anchor's seeds and bump Constraints

Anchor provides a convenient way to derive PDAs in the account validation struct using the seeds and bump constraints. These can even be combined with the init constraint to initialize the account at the intended address. To protect the program from the vulnerability we've been discussing throughout this lesson, Anchor does not even allow you to initialize an account at a PDA using anything but the canonical bump. Instead, it uses find_program_address to derive the PDA and subsequently performs the initialization.

use anchor_lang::prelude::*;
 
declare_id!("Fg6PaFpoGXkYsidMpWTK6W2BeZ7FEfcYkg476zPFsLnS");
 
pub const DISCRIMINATOR_SIZE: usize = 8;
 
#[program]
pub mod bump_seed_canonicalization_recommended {
    use super::*;
 
    pub fn set_value(ctx: Context<BumpSeed>, _key: u64, new_value: u64) -> Result<()> {
        ctx.accounts.data.value = new_value;
        Ok(())
    }
}
// Initialize account at PDA
#[derive(Accounts)]
#[instruction(key: u64)]
pub struct BumpSeed<'info> {
    #[account(mut)]
    pub payer: Signer<'info>,
    #[account(
        init,
        seeds = [key.to_le_bytes().as_ref()],
        // Derives the PDA using the canonical bump
        bump,
        payer = payer,
        space = DISCRIMINATOR_SIZE + Data::INIT_SPACE
    )]
    pub data: Account<'info, Data>,
 
    pub system_program: Program<'info, System>,
}
 
#[account]
#[derive(InitSpace)]
pub struct Data {
    pub value: u64,
}

If you aren't initializing an account, you can still validate PDAs with the seeds and bump constraints. This simply rederives the PDA and compares the derived address with the address of the account passed in.

In this scenario, Anchor does allow you to specify the bump to use to derive the PDA with bump = <some_bump>. The intent here is not for you to use arbitrary bumps, but rather to let you optimize your program. The iterative nature of find_program_address makes it expensive, so best practice is to store the canonical bump in the PDA account's data upon initializing a PDA, allowing you to reference the bump stored when validating the PDA in subsequent instruction handlers.

When you specify the bump to use, Anchor uses create_program_address with the provided bump instead of find_program_address. This pattern of storing the bump in the account data ensures that your program always uses the canonical bump without degrading performance.

use anchor_lang::prelude::*;
 
declare_id!("CVwV9RoebTbmzsGg1uqU1s4a3LvTKseewZKmaNLSxTqc");
 
// Constant for account space calculation
pub const DISCRIMINATOR_SIZE: usize = 8;
 
#[program]
pub mod bump_seed_canonicalization_recommended {
    use super::*;
 
    // Instruction handler to set a value and store the bump
    pub fn set_value(ctx: Context<BumpSeed>, _key: u64, new_value: u64) -> Result<()> {
        ctx.accounts.data.value = new_value;
 
        // Store the canonical bump on the account
        // This bump is automatically derived by Anchor
        ctx.accounts.data.bump = ctx.bumps.data;
 
        Ok(())
    }
 
    // Instruction handler to verify the PDA address
    pub fn verify_address(ctx: Context<VerifyAddress>, _key: u64) -> Result<()> {
        msg!("PDA confirmed to be derived with canonical bump: {}", ctx.accounts.data.key());
        Ok(())
    }
}
 
// Account validation struct for initializing the PDA account
#[derive(Accounts)]
#[instruction(key: u64)]
pub struct BumpSeed<'info> {
    #[account(mut)]
    pub payer: Signer<'info>,
 
    #[account(
        init,
        seeds = [key.to_le_bytes().as_ref()],
        bump,  // Anchor automatically uses the canonical bump
        payer = payer,
        space = DISCRIMINATOR_SIZE + Data::INIT_SPACE
    )]
    pub data: Account<'info, Data>,
 
    pub system_program: Program<'info, System>
}
 
// Account validation struct for verifying the PDA address
#[derive(Accounts)]
#[instruction(key: u64)]
pub struct VerifyAddress<'info> {
    #[account(
        seeds = [key.to_le_bytes().as_ref()],
        bump = data.bump  // Use the stored bump, guaranteed to be canonical
    )]
    pub data: Account<'info, Data>,
}
 
// Data structure for the PDA account
#[account]
#[derive(InitSpace)]
pub struct Data {
    pub value: u64,
    pub bump: u8  // Stores the canonical bump
}

If you don't specify the bump on the bump constraint, Anchor will still use find_program_address to derive the PDA using the canonical bump. As a consequence, your instruction handler will incur a variable amount of compute budget. Programs that are already at risk of exceeding their compute budget should use this with care since there is a chance that the program's budget may be occasionally and unpredictably exceeded.

On the other hand, if you only need to verify the address of a PDA passed in without initializing an account, you'll be forced to either let Anchor derive the canonical bump or expose your program to unnecessary risks. In that case, please use the canonical bump despite the slight mark against performance.

Lab

To demonstrate the security exploits possible when you don't check for the canonical bump, let's work with a program that lets each program user "claim" rewards on time.

1. Setup

Start by getting the code on the starter branch of this repository.

Notice that there are two instruction handlers on the program and a single test in the tests directory.

The instruction handlers on the program are:

create_user_insecure
claim_insecure

The create_user_insecure instruction handler simply creates a new account at a PDA derived using the signer's public key and a passed-in bump.

The claim_insecure instruction handler mints 10 tokens to the user and then marks the account's rewards as claimed so that they can't claim again.

However, the program doesn't explicitly check that the PDAs in question are using the canonical bump.

Have a look at the program to understand what it does before proceeding.

2. Test Insecure Instruction Handlers

Since the instruction handlers don't explicitly require the user PDA to use the canonical bump, an attacker can create multiple accounts per wallet and claim more rewards than should be allowed.

The test in the tests directory creates a new keypair called attacker to represent an attacker. It then loops through all possible bumps and calls create_user_insecure and claim_insecure. By the end, the test expects that the attacker has been able to claim rewards multiple times and has earned more than the 10 tokens allotted per user.

it("allows attacker to claim more than reward limit with insecure instruction handlers", async () => {
  try {
    const attacker = Keypair.generate();
    await airdropIfRequired(
      connection,
      attacker.publicKey,
      1 * LAMPORTS_PER_SOL,
      0.5 * LAMPORTS_PER_SOL,
    );
    const ataKey = await getAssociatedTokenAddress(mint, attacker.publicKey);
 
    let successfulClaimCount = 0;
 
    for (let i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
      try {
        const pda = anchor.web3.PublicKey.createProgramAddressSync(
          [attacker.publicKey.toBuffer(), Buffer.from([i])],
          program.programId,
        );
        await program.methods
          .createUserInsecure(i)
          .accounts({
            user: pda,
            payer: attacker.publicKey,
          })
          .signers([attacker])
          .rpc();
        await program.methods
          .claimInsecure(i)
          .accounts({
            user: pda,
            mint,
            payer: attacker.publicKey,
            userAta: ataKey,
            mintAuthority,
            tokenProgram: anchor.utils.token.TOKEN_PROGRAM_ID,
            associatedTokenProgram: anchor.utils.token.ASSOCIATED_PROGRAM_ID,
            systemProgram: anchor.web3.SystemProgram.programId,
            rent: anchor.web3.SYSVAR_RENT_PUBKEY,
          })
          .signers([attacker])
          .rpc();
 
        successfulClaimCount += 1;
      } catch (error) {
        if (
          error instanceof Error &&
          !error.message.includes(
            "Invalid seeds, address must fall off the curve",
          )
        ) {
          console.error(error);
        }
      }
    }
 
    const ata = await getAccount(connection, ataKey);
 
    console.log(
      `Attacker claimed ${successfulClaimCount} times and got ${Number(
        ata.amount,
      )} tokens`,
    );
 
    expect(successfulClaimCount).to.be.greaterThan(1);
    expect(Number(ata.amount)).to.be.greaterThan(10);
  } catch (error) {
    throw new Error(`Test failed: ${error.message}`);
  }
});

Run anchor test to see that this test passes, showing that the attacker is successful. Since the test calls the instruction handlers for every valid bump, it takes a bit to run, so be patient.

  Bump seed canonicalization
Attacker claimed 121 times and got 1210 tokens
    ✔ allows attacker to claim more than reward limit with insecure instructions (119994ms)

3. Create Secure Instruction Handler

Let's demonstrate patching the vulnerability by creating two new instruction handlers:

create_user_secure
claim_secure

Before we write the account validation or instruction handler logic, let's create a new user type, UserSecure. This new type will add the canonical bump as a field on the struct.

// Secure user account structure
#[account]
#[derive(InitSpace)]
pub struct UserSecure {
    pub auth: Pubkey,
    pub bump: u8,
    pub rewards_claimed: bool,
}

Next, let's create account validation structs for each of the new instruction handlers. They'll be very similar to the insecure versions but will let Anchor handle the derivation and deserialization of the PDAs.

// Account validation struct for securely creating a user account
#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct CreateUserSecure<'info> {
    #[account(mut)]
    pub payer: Signer<'info>,
    #[account(
        init,
        payer = payer,
        space = DISCRIMINATOR_SIZE + UserSecure::INIT_SPACE,
        seeds = [payer.key().as_ref()],
        bump
    )]
    pub user: Account<'info, UserSecure>,
    pub system_program: Program<'info, System>,
}
 
// Account validation struct for secure claiming of rewards
#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct SecureClaim<'info> {
    #[account(
        mut,
        seeds = [payer.key().as_ref()],
        bump = user.bump,
        constraint = !user.rewards_claimed @ ClaimError::AlreadyClaimed,
        constraint = user.auth == payer.key()
    )]
    pub user: Account<'info, UserSecure>,
    #[account(mut)]
    pub payer: Signer<'info>,
    #[account(
        init_if_needed,
        payer = payer,
        associated_token::mint = mint,
        associated_token::authority = payer
    )]
    pub user_ata: Account<'info, TokenAccount>,
    #[account(mut)]
    pub mint: Account<'info, Mint>,
    /// CHECK: This is the mint authority PDA, checked by seeds constraint
    #[account(seeds = [b"mint"], bump)]
    pub mint_authority: UncheckedAccount<'info>,
    pub token_program: Program<'info, Token>,
    pub associated_token_program: Program<'info, AssociatedToken>,
    pub system_program: Program<'info, System>,
    pub rent: Sysvar<'info, Rent>,
}

Finally, let's implement the instruction handler logic for the two new instruction handlers. The create_user_secure instruction handler simply needs to set the auth, bump and rewards_claimed fields on the user account data.

// Secure instruction to create a user account
pub fn create_user_secure(ctx: Context<CreateUserSecure>) -> Result<()> {
    ctx.accounts.user.set_inner(UserSecure {
        auth: ctx.accounts.payer.key(),
        bump: ctx.bumps.user,
        rewards_claimed: false,
    });
    Ok(())
}

The claim_secure instruction handler needs to mint 10 tokens to the user and set the user account's rewards_claimed field to true.

// Secure instruction to claim rewards
pub fn claim_secure(ctx: Context<SecureClaim>) -> Result<()> {
    // Mint tokens to the user's associated token account
    token::mint_to(
        CpiContext::new_with_signer(
            ctx.accounts.token_program.to_account_info(),
            MintTo {
                mint: ctx.accounts.mint.to_account_info(),
                to: ctx.accounts.user_ata.to_account_info(),
                authority: ctx.accounts.mint_authority.to_account_info(),
            },
            &[&[b"mint", &[ctx.bumps.mint_authority]]],
        ),
        10,
    )?;
 
    // Mark rewards as claimed
    ctx.accounts.user.rewards_claimed = true;
 
    Ok(())
}

4. Test Secure Instruction Handlers

Let's go ahead and write a test to show that the attacker can no longer claim more than once using the new instruction handlers.

Notice that if you start to loop through using multiple PDAs like the old test, you can't even pass the non-canonical bump to the instruction handlers. However, you can still loop through using the various PDAs and at the end check that only 1 claim happened for a total of 10 tokens. Your final test will look something like this:

it("allows attacker to claim only once with secure instruction handlers", async () => {
  try {
    const attacker = Keypair.generate();
    await airdropIfRequired(
      connection,
      attacker.publicKey,
      1 * LAMPORTS_PER_SOL,
      0.5 * LAMPORTS_PER_SOL,
    );
    const ataKey = await getAssociatedTokenAddress(mint, attacker.publicKey);
    const [userPDA] = anchor.web3.PublicKey.findProgramAddressSync(
      [attacker.publicKey.toBuffer()],
      program.programId,
    );
 
    await program.methods
      .createUserSecure()
      .accounts({
        payer: attacker.publicKey,
        user: userPDA,
        systemProgram: anchor.web3.SystemProgram.programId,
      })
      .signers([attacker])
      .rpc();
 
    await program.methods
      .claimSecure()
      .accounts({
        payer: attacker.publicKey,
        user: userPDA,
        userAta: ataKey,
        mint,
        mintAuthority,
        tokenProgram: anchor.utils.token.TOKEN_PROGRAM_ID,
        associatedTokenProgram: anchor.utils.token.ASSOCIATED_PROGRAM_ID,
        systemProgram: anchor.web3.SystemProgram.programId,
        rent: anchor.web3.SYSVAR_RENT_PUBKEY,
      })
      .signers([attacker])
      .rpc();
 
    let successfulClaimCount = 1;
 
    for (let i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
      try {
        const pda = anchor.web3.PublicKey.createProgramAddressSync(
          [attacker.publicKey.toBuffer(), Buffer.from([i])],
          program.programId,
        );
        await program.methods
          .createUserSecure()
          .accounts({
            user: pda,
            payer: attacker.publicKey,
            systemProgram: anchor.web3.SystemProgram.programId,
          })
          .signers([attacker])
          .rpc();
 
        await program.methods
          .claimSecure()
          .accounts({
            payer: attacker.publicKey,
            user: pda,
            userAta: ataKey,
            mint,
            mintAuthority,
            tokenProgram: anchor.utils.token.TOKEN_PROGRAM_ID,
            associatedTokenProgram: anchor.utils.token.ASSOCIATED_PROGRAM_ID,
            systemProgram: anchor.web3.SystemProgram.programId,
            rent: anchor.web3.SYSVAR_RENT_PUBKEY,
          })
          .signers([attacker])
          .rpc();
 
        successfulClaimCount += 1;
      } catch (error) {
        if (
          error instanceof Error &&
          !error.message.includes("Error Number: 2006") &&
          !error.message.includes(
            "Invalid seeds, address must fall off the curve",
          )
        ) {
          // Comment console error logs to see the test outputs properly
          console.error(error);
        }
      }
    }
 
    const ata = await getAccount(connection, ataKey);
 
    console.log(
      `Attacker claimed ${successfulClaimCount} times and got ${Number(
        ata.amount,
      )} tokens`,
    );
 
    expect(Number(ata.amount)).to.equal(10);
    expect(successfulClaimCount).to.equal(1);
  } catch (error) {
    throw new Error(`Test failed: ${error.message}`);
  }
});

  Bump seed canonicalization
Attacker claimed 119 times and got 1190 tokens
    ✔ allows attacker to claim more than reward limit with insecure instruction handlers (117370ms)
Attacker claimed 1 times and got 10 tokens
    ✔ allows attacker to claim only once with secure instruction handlers (16362ms)

If you use Anchor for all of the PDA derivations, this particular exploit is pretty simple to avoid. However, if you end up doing anything "non-standard," be careful to design your program to explicitly use the canonical bump!

If you want to take a look at the final solution code you can find it on the solution branch of the same repository.

Challenge

Just as with other lessons in this unit, your opportunity to practice avoiding this security exploit lies in auditing your own or other programs.

Take some time to review at least one program and ensure that all PDA derivations and checks are using the canonical bump.

Remember, if you find a bug or exploit in somebody else's program, please alert them! If you find one in your own program, be sure to patch it right away.

Completed the lab?

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