Signer Authorization

Summary #

Signer Checks are essential to verify that specific accounts have signed a transaction. Without proper signer checks, unauthorized accounts may execute instructions they shouldn't be allowed to perform.
In Anchor, you can use the Signer account type in your account validation struct to automatically perform a signer check on a given account.
Anchor also provides the #[account(signer)] constraint, which automatically verifies that a specified account has signed the transaction.

In native Rust, implement a signer check by verifying that an account's is_signer property is true:

if !ctx.accounts.authority.is_signer {
    return Err(ProgramError::MissingRequiredSignature.into());
}

Lesson #

Signer checks ensure that only authorized accounts can execute specific instructions. Without these checks, any account might perform operations that should be restricted, potentially leading to severe security vulnerabilities, such as unauthorized access and control over program accounts.

Missing Signer Check #

Below is an oversimplified instruction handler that updates the authority field on a program account. Notice that the authority field in the UpdateAuthority account validation struct is of type UncheckedAccount. In Anchor, the UncheckedAccount type indicates that no checks are performed on the account before executing the instruction handler.

Although the has_one constraint ensures that the authority account passed to the instruction handler matches the authority field on the vault account, there is no verification that the authority account actually authorized the transaction.

This omission allows an attacker to pass in the authority account’s public key and their own public key as the new_authority account, effectively reassigning themselves as the new authority of the vault account. Once they have control, they can interact with the program as the new authority.

use anchor_lang::prelude::*;
 
declare_id!("Fg6PaFpoGXkYsidMpWTK6W2BeZ7FEfcYkg476zPFsLnS");
 
#[program]
pub mod insecure_update{
    use super::*;
        ...
        pub fn update_authority(ctx: Context<UpdateAuthority>) -> Result<()> {
        ctx.accounts.vault.authority = ctx.accounts.new_authority.key();
        Ok(())
    }
}
 
#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct UpdateAuthority<'info> {
   #[account(
        mut,
        has_one = authority
    )]
    pub vault: Account<'info, Vault>,
    /// CHECK: This account will not be checked by Anchor
    pub new_authority: UncheckedAccount<'info>,
    /// CHECK: This account will not be checked by Anchor
    pub authority: UncheckedAccount<'info>,
}
 
#[account]
pub struct Vault {
    token_account: Pubkey,
    authority: Pubkey,
}

Adding Signer Authorization Checks #

To validate that the authority account signed the transaction, add a signer check within the instruction handler:

if !ctx.accounts.authority.is_signer {
    return Err(ProgramError::MissingRequiredSignature.into());
}

By adding this check, the instruction handler will only proceed if the authority account has signed the transaction. If the account is not signed, the transaction will fail.

use anchor_lang::prelude::*;
 
declare_id!("Fg6PaFpoGXkYsidMpWTK6W2BeZ7FEfcYkg476zPFsLnS");
 
#[program]
pub mod secure_update{
    use super::*;
        ...
        pub fn update_authority(ctx: Context<UpdateAuthority>) -> Result<()> {
            if !ctx.accounts.authority.is_signer {
            return Err(ProgramError::MissingRequiredSignature.into());
        }
 
        ctx.accounts.vault.authority = ctx.accounts.new_authority.key();
        Ok(())
    }
}
 
#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct UpdateAuthority<'info> {
    #[account(
        mut,
        has_one = authority
    )]
    pub vault: Account<'info, Vault>,
    /// CHECK: This account will not be checked by Anchor
    pub new_authority: UncheckedAccount<'info>,
    /// CHECK: This account will not be checked by Anchor
    pub authority: UncheckedAccount<'info>,
}
 
#[account]
pub struct Vault {
    token_account: Pubkey,
    authority: Pubkey,
}

Use Anchor’s Signer Account Type #

Incorporating the signer check directly within the instruction handler logic can blur the separation between account validation and instruction handler execution. To maintain this separation, use Anchor's Signer account type. By changing the authority account's type to Signer in the validation struct, Anchor automatically checks at runtime that the specified account signed the transaction.

use anchor_lang::prelude::*;
 
declare_id!("Fg6PaFpoGXkYsidMpWTK6W2BeZ7FEfcYkg476zPFsLnS");
 
#[program]
pub mod secure_update{
    use super::*;
        ...
        pub fn update_authority(ctx: Context<UpdateAuthority>) -> Result<()> {
        ctx.accounts.vault.authority = ctx.accounts.new_authority.key();
        Ok(())
    }
}
 
#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct UpdateAuthority<'info> {
    #[account(
        mut,
        has_one = authority
    )]
    pub vault: Account<'info, Vault>,
    /// CHECK: This account will not be checked by Anchor
    pub new_authority: UncheckedAccount<'info>,
    pub authority: Signer<'info>,
}
 
#[account]
pub struct Vault {
    token_account: Pubkey,
    authority: Pubkey,
}

Info

When you use the Signer type, no other ownership or type checks are performed.

Using Anchor’s `#[account(signer)]` Constraint #

While the Signer account type is useful, it doesn't perform other ownership or type checks, limiting its use in instruction handler logic. The anchor's #[account(signer)] constraint addresses this by verifying that the account signed the transaction while allowing access to its underlying data.

For example, if you expect an account to be both a signer and a data source, using the Signer type would require manual deserialization, and you wouldn't benefit from automatic ownership and type checking. Instead, the #[account(signer)] constraint allows you to access the data and ensure the account signed the transaction.

In this example, you can safely interact with the data stored in the authority account while ensuring that it signed the transaction.

use anchor_lang::prelude::*;
 
declare_id!("Fg6PaFpoGXkYsidMpWTK6W2BeZ7FEfcYkg476zPFsLnS");
 
#[program]
pub mod secure_update{
    use super::*;
        ...
        pub fn update_authority(ctx: Context<UpdateAuthority>) -> Result<()> {
        ctx.accounts.vault.authority = ctx.accounts.new_authority.key();
 
        // access the data stored in authority
        msg!("Total number of depositors: {}", ctx.accounts.authority.num_depositors);
        Ok(())
    }
}
 
#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct UpdateAuthority<'info> {
    #[account(
        mut,
        has_one = authority
    )]
    pub vault: Account<'info, Vault>,
    /// CHECK: This account will not be checked by Anchor
    pub new_authority: UncheckedAccount<'info>,
    #[account(signer)]
    pub authority: Account<'info, AuthState>
}
 
#[account]
pub struct Vault {
    token_account: Pubkey,
    authority: Pubkey,
}
#[account]
pub struct AuthState{
    amount: u64,
    num_depositors: u64,
    num_vaults: u64
}

Lab #

In this lab, we'll create a simple program to demonstrate how a missing signer check can allow an attacker to withdraw tokens that don't belong to them. This program initializes a simplified token vault account and shows how the absence of a signer check could result in the vault being drained.

1. Starter #

To get started, download the starter code from the starter branch of this repository. The starter code includes a program with two instruction handlers and the boilerplate setup for the test file.

The initialize_vault instruction handler sets up two new accounts: Vault and TokenAccount. The Vault account is initialized using a Program Derived Address (PDA) and stores the address of a token account and the vault's authority. The vault PDA will be the authority of the token account, enabling the program to sign off on token transfers.

The insecure_withdraw instruction handler transfers tokens from the vault account’s token account to a withdraw_destination token account. However, the authority account in the InsecureWithdraw struct is of type UncheckedAccount, a wrapper around AccountInfo that explicitly indicates the account is unchecked.

Without a signer check, anyone can provide the public key of the authority account that matches the authority stored on the vault account, and the insecure_withdraw instruction handler will continue processing.

Although this example is somewhat contrived, as any DeFi program with a vault would be more sophisticated, it effectively illustrates how the lack of a signer check can lead to unauthorized token withdrawals.

use anchor_lang::prelude::*;
use anchor_spl::token::{self, Mint, Token, TokenAccount};
 
declare_id!("FeKh59XMh6BcN6UdekHnaFHsNH9NVE121GgDzSyYPKKS");
 
pub const DISCRIMINATOR_SIZE: usize = 8;
 
#[program]
pub mod signer_authorization {
    use super::*;
 
    pub fn initialize_vault(ctx: Context<InitializeVault>) -> Result<()> {
        ctx.accounts.vault.token_account = ctx.accounts.token_account.key();
        ctx.accounts.vault.authority = ctx.accounts.authority.key();
        Ok(())
    }
 
    pub fn insecure_withdraw(ctx: Context<InsecureWithdraw>) -> Result<()> {
        let amount = ctx.accounts.token_account.amount;
 
        let seeds = &[b"vault".as_ref(), &[ctx.bumps.vault]];
        let signer = [&seeds[..]];
 
        let cpi_ctx = CpiContext::new_with_signer(
            ctx.accounts.token_program.to_account_info(),
            token::Transfer {
                from: ctx.accounts.token_account.to_account_info(),
                authority: ctx.accounts.vault.to_account_info(),
                to: ctx.accounts.withdraw_destination.to_account_info(),
            },
            &signer,
        );
 
        token::transfer(cpi_ctx, amount)?;
        Ok(())
    }
}
 
#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct InitializeVault<'info> {
    #[account(
        init,
        payer = authority,
        space = DISCRIMINATOR_SIZE + Vault::INIT_SPACE,
        seeds = [b"vault"],
        bump
    )]
    pub vault: Account<'info, Vault>,
    #[account(
        init,
        payer = authority,
        token::mint = mint,
        token::authority = vault,
    )]
    pub token_account: Account<'info, TokenAccount>,
    pub mint: Account<'info, Mint>,
    #[account(mut)]
    pub authority: Signer<'info>,
    pub token_program: Program<'info, Token>,
    pub system_program: Program<'info, System>,
    pub rent: Sysvar<'info, Rent>,
}
 
#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct InsecureWithdraw<'info> {
    #[account(
        seeds = [b"vault"],
        bump,
        has_one = token_account,
        has_one = authority
    )]
    pub vault: Account<'info, Vault>,
    #[account(mut)]
    pub token_account: Account<'info, TokenAccount>,
    #[account(mut)]
    pub withdraw_destination: Account<'info, TokenAccount>,
    pub token_program: Program<'info, Token>,
    /// CHECK: demo missing signer check
    pub authority: UncheckedAccount<'info>,
}
 
#[account]
#[derive(Default, InitSpace)]
pub struct Vault {
    token_account: Pubkey,
    authority: Pubkey,
}

2. Test insecure_withdraw Instruction Handler #

The test file includes code to invoke the initialize_vault instruction handler, using walletAuthority as the authority on the vault. The code then mints 100 tokens to the vaultTokenAccount token account. Ideally, only the walletAuthority key should be able to withdraw these 100 tokens from the vault.

Next, we'll add a test to invoke insecure_withdraw on the program to demonstrate that the current version allows a third party to withdraw those 100 tokens.

In the test, we'll use the walletAuthority public key as the authority account but sign and send the transaction with a different keypair.

describe("Signer Authorization", () => {
    ...
    it("performs insecure withdraw", async () => {
    try {
      const transaction = await program.methods
        .insecureWithdraw()
        .accounts({
          vault: vaultPDA,
          tokenAccount: vaultTokenAccount.publicKey,
          withdrawDestination: unauthorizedWithdrawDestination,
          authority: walletAuthority.publicKey,
        })
        .transaction();
 
      await anchor.web3.sendAndConfirmTransaction(connection, transaction, [
        unauthorizedWallet,
      ]);
 
      const tokenAccountInfo = await getAccount(
        connection,
        vaultTokenAccount.publicKey
      );
      expect(Number(tokenAccountInfo.amount)).to.equal(0);
    } catch (error) {
      console.error("Insecure withdraw failed:", error);
      throw error;
    }
  });
})

Run anchor test to confirm that both transactions will be completed successfully.

Signer Authorization
    ✔ initializes vault and mints tokens (882ms)
    ✔ performs insecure withdraw (435ms)

The insecure_withdraw instruction handler demonstrates a security vulnerability. Since there is no signer check for the authority account, this handler will transfer tokens from the vaultTokenAccount to the unauthorizedWithdrawDestination, as long as the public key of the authority account matches the walletAuthority.publicKey stored in the vault account's authority field.

In the test, we use the unauthorizedWallet to sign the transaction, while still specifying the walletAuthority.publicKey as the authority in the instruction accounts. This mismatch between the signer and the specified authority would normally cause a transaction to fail. However, due to the lack of a proper signer check in the insecure_withdraw handler, the transaction succeeds.

3. Add secure_withdraw Instruction Handler #

To fix this issue, we'll create a new instruction handler called secure_withdraw. This instruction handler will be identical to insecure_withdraw, but we'll use the Signer type in the Accounts struct to validate the authority account in the SecureWithdraw struct. If the authority account isn't a signer on the transaction, the transaction should fail with an error.

use anchor_lang::prelude::*;
use anchor_spl::token::{self, Mint, Token, TokenAccount};
 
declare_id!("Fg6PaFpoGXkYsidMpWTK6W2BeZ7FEfcYkg476zPFsLnS");
 
#[program]
pub mod signer_authorization {
    use super::*;
    ...
    pub fn secure_withdraw(ctx: Context<SecureWithdraw>) -> Result<()> {
        let amount = ctx.accounts.token_account.amount;
 
        let seeds = &[b"vault".as_ref(), &[ctx.bumps.vault]];
        let signer = [&seeds[..]];
 
        let cpi_ctx = CpiContext::new_with_signer(
            ctx.accounts.token_program.to_account_info(),
            token::Transfer {
                from: ctx.accounts.token_account.to_account_info(),
                authority: ctx.accounts.vault.to_account_info(),
                to: ctx.accounts.withdraw_destination.to_account_info(),
            },
            &signer,
        );
 
        token::transfer(cpi_ctx, amount)?;
        Ok(())
    }
}
 
#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct SecureWithdraw<'info> {
    #[account(
        seeds = [b"vault"],
        bump,
        has_one = token_account,
        has_one = authority
    )]
    pub vault: Account<'info, Vault>,
    #[account(mut)]
    pub token_account: Account<'info, TokenAccount>,
    #[account(mut)]
    pub withdraw_destination: Account<'info, TokenAccount>,
    pub token_program: Program<'info, Token>,
    pub authority: Signer<'info>,
}

4. Test secure_withdraw Instruction Handler #

With the new instruction handler in place, return to the test file to test the secureWithdraw instruction handler. Invoke the secureWithdraw instruction handler, using the walletAuthority.publicKey as the authority account, and use the unauthorizedWallet keypair as the signer. Set the unauthorizedWithdrawDestination as the withdraw destination.

Since the authority account is validated using the Signer type, the transaction should fail with a signature verification error. This is because the unauthorizedWallet is attempting to sign the transaction, but it doesn't match the authority specified in the instruction (which is walletAuthority.publicKey).

The test expects this transaction to fail, demonstrating that the secure withdraw function properly validates the signer. If the transaction unexpectedly succeeds, the test will throw an error indicating that the expected security check did not occur.

describe("Signer Authorization", () => {
    ...
    it("fails to perform secure withdraw with incorrect signer", async () => {
    try {
      const transaction = await program.methods
        .secureWithdraw()
        .accounts({
          vault: vaultPDA,
          tokenAccount: vaultTokenAccount.publicKey,
          withdrawDestination: unauthorizedWithdrawDestination,
          authority: walletAuthority.publicKey,
        })
        .transaction();
 
      await anchor.web3.sendAndConfirmTransaction(connection, transaction, [
        unauthorizedWallet,
      ]);
      throw new Error("Expected transaction to fail, but it succeeded");
    } catch (error) {
      expect(error).to.be.an("error");
      console.log("Error message:", error.message);
    }
  });
})

Run anchor test to see that the transaction now returns a signature verification error.

signer-authorization
Error message: Signature verification failed.
Missing signature for public key [`GprrWv9r8BMxQiWea9MrbCyK7ig7Mj8CcseEbJhDDZXM`].
    ✔ fails to perform secure withdraw with incorrect signer

This example shows how important it is to think through who should authorize instructions and ensure that each is a signer on the transaction.

To review the final solution code, you can find it on the solution branch of the repository.

Challenge #

Now that you've worked through the labs and challenges in this course, it's time to apply your knowledge in a practical setting. For this challenge and those that follow on security vulnerabilities, audit your own programs for the specific vulnerability discussed in each lesson.

Steps #

Audit Your Program or Find an Open Source Project:
- Begin by auditing your own code for missing signer checks, or find an open source Solana program to audit. A great place to start is with the program examples repository.
Look for Signer Check Issues:
- Focus on instruction handlers where signer authorization is crucial, especially those that transfer tokens or modify sensitive account data.
- Review the program for any UncheckedAccount types where signer validation should be enforced.
- Ensure that any accounts that should require user authorization are defined as Signer in the instruction handler.
Patch or Report:
- If you find a bug in your own code, fix it by using the Signer type for accounts that require signer validation.
- If the issue exists in an open source project, notify the project maintainers or submit a pull request.

Completed the lab?

After completing the challenge, push your code to GitHub and tell us what you thought of this lesson!